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     This paper concerns the design of the firm organization to 
obtain and use information efficiently in organization decision 
making. The focus is on coordination of shop managers' operating 
decisions through the choice of the organization structure such 
as the coordination system (hierarchical or horizontal) and 
information processing capacities of subordinates (specialists or 
generalists). Assuming that information acquiring, processing, 
and communication are costly, we show that in "volatile" 
environments, the optimal organization structure is the one 
typically found in Japanese firms, where coordination tasks are 
delegated to subordinates who are nonspecialized in tasks and 
information acquiring so that they can share each other's 
cn-the-spot knowledge.
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1. Introduction 
This paper concerns the problem of coordination i organizational decision making that 
arises because of members' pecialization in different information sources and their limited 
rationality. Since the firm is surrounded by uncertain, changing, complex environments, i  
managers must collect a huge amount of data from various information sources and process 
those data in order to acquire information.or knowledge valuable in their decision making. 
Those managers are limitedly rational in information acquisition and processing: their 
attention to data and their information processing capacities are usually scarce resources.1 
One advantage ofthe organization is that it can have its members specialize in different 
information sources, which enables the firm to obtain more information than when it is 
managed by a single manager. However, even if all the members share the same organization 
goal, their independent decision making may be far from desirable from the organizational 
point of view because of differential information among members. We need to coordinate 
decisions by specialized members. 
   In hierarchical organizations, this coordination problem can usually be solved by au-
thority. That is, when each member but one distinguished "top" manager has one and 
  * This is a modified version of a chapter in my dissertation. I would like to thank 
Masahiko Aoki, Hugo Hopenhayn, and David Kreps for their comments and encouragement. 
Remaining errors are, of course, my own. 
  t Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; and Faculty of 
Economics, Kyoto University, Kyoto 606, Japan. 
  1 The development i  mechanical information-processing ystems in the today's world, 
such as computers, does not resolve this problem: the scarce resource isnot data but human 
capabilities. See Simon (1974). 
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only one direct boss, each boss is able to coordinate decisions of his or her subordinates by 
receiving from them reports concerning the information they possess, and then by telling 
them what to do. One problem of this authoritative system is that attention or abilities of 
the upper-level managers are also limited, so that it is difficult to suppose that they can 
share all the knowledge of their specialized subordinates through reports. Hence the hier-
archical coordination system may lose the opportunity to utilize on-the-spot information 
only available to lower-level members for the organizational decision making. 
   Therefore, even in the hierarchical organization, it may be of value to delegate co-
ordination itself to lower-level members of the organization. In this "horizontal" coordi-
nation system, too much specialization will be harmful for the reasons mentioned above. 
Some knowledge sharing among subordinate members through horizontal communication 
or adoption of generalist-type members may be preferable. 
   By parametric analysis of a simple model, this paper examines the performance of 
these two kinds of coordination systems. More specifically, the model is described as fol-
lows: The firm is a two-tier hierarchy, consisting of a top manager and many subordinate 
shop managers. Each member of the organization observes noisy signals concerning some 
components of a multidimensional random variable that represents the uncertain environ-
ment. Each component may represent profitability of an industry where the firm operates, 
or it may represent echnological conditions specific to each shop. The payoff to the firm, 
which is assumed to coincide with each member's objective, depends upon the subordinates' 
actions and the realization of the random variable. Specifically, we assume a quadratic form 
composed of three terms as the firm's objective function. The first term increases if the 
actions are closer to the state variable, the second one increases if, in each given shop, the 
actions are closer to each other, and the last term is higher as the actions in one shop are 
closer to the actions in others. For example, imagine that two workers try to discern the 
source of breakdown of two machines as precisely as possible. The first term is higher as 
their joint efforts detect the problem of each machine more closely. The increase in the 
second term comes from coordination of theirr actions for each machine. The last term 
increases if their joint actions are coordinated across machines. 
   The novel feature of the model is that the top manager can choose information pro-
cessing capacities of subordinate members in the -organization. The information processing 
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capacity is defined as an ability of each member to perceive the environmental variable. In 
the model presented in Section 2, each subordinate observes each component of the state 
variable plus a.noise term. All random variables are assumed to have a Normal distribution, 
hence the precision of each noise term represents the subordinate's ability to perceive that 
component. The firm will attempt to acquire employees with desirable expertise through 
searching labor markets or designing promotion and job rotation systems. We assume that 
better abilities are more costly because of training or search costs. Then one of our concerns 
is whether the top manager should choose as subordinate members many generalists who 
have good abilities for all components of the state variable, or choose many specialists who 
are excellent for some particular components, but poor for others. 
   In Itoh (1987), a simple one-top and one-subordinate organization was considered, 
and the optimal information processing capacity of the subordinate was examined, where 
the subordinates' information processing capacity may depend on a variable representing 
some global aspects of the environment observed by the top manager. Therefore, "strategic 
decisions" made by the top manager usually affect "operating decisions" subsequently made 
by subordinates because their capacities depend on what the top manager observes and 
decides. In this paper, however, this interdependence is ignored. Instead, I consider a one-
top and two-subordinate organization and ask how to coordinate actions of two subordinates 
who may pursue idiosyncratic subob jectives because of differential information. That is, in 
this paper, strategic decisions by the top manager are assumed to be fixed, and the focus 
is on coordination of operating decisions implemented by several subordinates through the 
choice of the coordination system and their information processing capacities. 
    In this setting, two coordination systems mentioned above are defined as follows. In 
the hierarchical coordination system, the top manager collects information from shop man-
agers and makes all organizational decisions. Then the top manager orders subordinates to 
implement her decisions.2 Here we assume that each shop manager cannot infer the obser-
vation of the other subordinate from the command by the top manager.3 This assumption 
  2 As in the last paper, the top manager is assumed to be a female and each shop manager 
a male for the purposes of identification. 
  3 Of course
, we assume that subordinate members are Bayesian players in their infor-
mation processing with their direct information sources. The point is that the inference 
from the order is too subtle for them to understand its informational content. 
3
introduces another important aspect of limited rationality, different from limited attention, 
into the model. If subordinates had such inference abilities, they would recalculate the 
optimal decision based on their inference, so that there would be no role of orders.4 Since 
the top manager decides everything under this system, it has some advantage in solving 
the coordination problem due to differential information.5 However, there are some dis-
advantages, too. The top manager also requires a sufficient amount of time to read and 
understand the reports, and the more time she spends reading the reports, the more ac-
curately she understands them while the more costs are created from delay of her decision 
making. Then generally the top manager cannot share in all the information subordinates 
have. 
   In the second coordination system, called the horizontal coordination system, the shop 
managers make their own decisions, without any suggestion by the top manager, possibly 
after sharing partially what they know by interchange of information. Note that under 
this system, the task structure matters: The task structure specifies who determines which 
actions. We consider two task structures: the specialized task structure makes each sub-
ordinate specialize in the actions relevant o his job shop while under the nonspecialized 
task structure, each subordinate is involved in the decision making in both job shops. Since 
each shop manager makes decisions depending on his knowledge, the resolution of the coor-
dination problem will be imperfect. Also there are the same problems of limited attention 
to reports as in the case of the hierarchical system. Under this system, however, each sub-
ordinate can use for his decision the on-the-spot information directly collected by himself 
from information sources, which is not available to the top manager under the hierarchical 
system. 
   The questions asked in the paper are: Under each coordination system, does the top 
  4 For more detailed arguments concerning this, see Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1985), 
who first pointed out the relation of such bounded rationality to the role of command in 
the organization. 
  5 It is more general and realistic to assume that the top manager limits the sets of actions 
that the subordinates may undertake rather than chooses particular actions. Then the 
problem becomes the choice of the optimal mix of two systems. In this chapter, I consider 
two extreme organization structures to focus on the relation between the coordination 
system and information processing capacities. Another justification of the assumption in 
the main text is that the two-stage action choice described in this footnote may cause 
prohibitively expensive time delay for implementing actions. 
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manager choose generalists or specialists as shop managers? How is that choice affected by 
the environment? How does the optimal choice of the coordination system depend on the 
environment? 
   The basis of the model and the analysis the theory of teams. (Arrow, 1985; Marschak, 
1974; Marschak and Radner, 1972.) Team theory sets the stage for the analysis of the 
information structure (which specifies the information available to each member) as well as 
the decision structure. Recent research on the economics oforganizations has put greater 
emphasis on the information tocontrol subordinates in the firm hierarchy who pursue their 
objectives differing from the firm's goal. (See Holmstrom and Tirole, 1987, for a survey.) 
Since my concern in this paper is in the choice of the information structure to improve 
organizational decision making, I ignore incentive aspects of the organization, though the 
importance of conflicts within the organization are not meant o be underemphasized.6 
Therefore, the model examines the performance of several organization structures from 
the perspective of limited rationality (imperfect communication a d limited attention), 
provided that incentive problems are resolved so that each member of the organization 
shares the same organizational goal. How such alignment is achieved is another important 
problem and is beyond the scope of this paper. We return to this problem in Section 7. 
    The analysis of the two coordination systems in this paper is related to the recent stud-
ies comparing American (or more generally, Western) management wi h Japanese manage-
ment. (See Lincoln and McBride, 1987, for a survey.) According to those studies, especially 
Aoki (1988),. the stylized nature of the coordination i the American firm is characterized 
by the hierarchical nd authoritative coordination ofspecialized tasks, while the Japanese 
firm typically adopts a different kind of coordination system, with the following two main 
features: horizontal information flows and ambiguous job separation. Aoki compares the 
operational coordination system in the manufacturing department ofthe stylized Western 
firm and the typical Japanese firm, given the "strategic" decisions set by the top man-
agement under both firms. He asserts that in the Japanese firm, as is represented by the 
well-known "kanban" system, once initial preliminary production plans are set by the cen-
tral planning unit, then operational coordination, without any further interruption by the 
  6 Other models examining the information structure of the organization, based on team 
theory, include Aoki (1986), Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1985), and Green and Laffont 
(1986). These are discussed in Section 8. 
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center, is conducted at the shop floor levels through horizontal information flow. And he 
points out that the other feature, ambiguous and fluid job demarcation, is observed in the 
regular rotation of workers in Japanese work organizations. 
   Aoki argues that when scale economies are less important, and flexible and quick 
adaptation to "volatile" environments becomes imperative, the hierarchical organization of 
work, carefully supported by Williamson (1985) on efficiency grounds, may not economize 
transaction costs as well as the Japanese system does. His argument is extensive, including 
dynamic learning effects and incentive aspects, so that our model is too simple to cope 
with all of his assertions.7 However, we show in our model, which is based solely on 
limited rationality such as communication costs and limited attention, that hierarchical 
coordination tends to depend more on specialization than does horizontal coordination, and 
that in highly uncertain, "volatile" environments wherein scale efficiencies are small and 
quick, flexible responses to changing environments are important, horizontal coordination 
with nonspecialized capacities and nonspecialized tasks works best. Therefore, insofar as 
our simple model captures ome of the essential characteristics of both typical Western 
firms and Japanese firms correctly, the results are compatible with Aoki's arguments. 
   Though Aoki (1988) concentrates onproduction systems and does not offer any em-
pirical evidence, Kagono et al. (1985) seem to support his arguments in a context more 
general than operating decisions. Their survey research comparing strategy and organi-
zation in American management and Japanese management shows that coordination in 
Japanese firms depends more on sharing of values and information among employees in 
different positions (e.g. between manufacturing departments and marketing departments, 
among different brand managers, and so on). They observe that in Japanese firms, each 
functional manager sometimes invades the functions of other managers and departments. 
   In addition, there is some literature comparing the skill formation within the firm 
through OJT (on-the-job training) between the U.S. and Japan, especially Koike (1977). 
(This is the book written in Japanese. Koike (1978) is the English translation of the last 
paper of the book. Also see Koike (1984) where he summarizes his main findings.) He 
investigated the skill formation process in shop floors in both the U.S. and Japanese firms, 
  7 His reasoning about the disadvantage of the hierarchy isbased on: (i) high inventory 
costs, (ii) rigidity of specialization, (iii) communication costs in the hierarchy, and (iv) the 
lack of incentive to respond to local shocks. 
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through extensive field research, and he finds that OJT for blue-collar workers in Japanese 
firms includes a wider variety of jobs than for blue-collar workers in American firms. He 
argues that this property of typical Japanese firms, together with the regular rotation of 
workers, makes the workers both skilled in a relatively wide range of jobs and familiar with 
the whole work process. 
   This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is introduced. In Section 
3, some preliminary analysis is conducted. In particular, the simple case where there is no 
need for coordination across shops is examined. It is shown that when coordination across 
shops is unnecessary the horizontal system with the specialized task structure is always 
optimal. This result supports the M-form (multi-divisional form) when the firm operates 
in two unrelated industries. Then we move to the case in which coordination across hops is 
extremely important. In this case, the horizontal system with the specialized task structure 
is always dominated by the hierarchical system, so that thereafter we concentrate on the 
hierarchical system and the horizontal system with nonspecialized task structure where 
each manager has to be involved in the management of both shops. Section 4 examines 
the hierarchical coordination system. We show that under the hierarchical system, the top 
manager always makes ubordinates specialize in different information sources. Section 5
is devoted to the analysis of the horizontal coordination system with nonspecialized task 
structures. Under the horizontal system, the optimal information processing capacities 
depend on several parameters. Based on the results in Sections 4 and 5, the optimal 
coordination system and information structure of the firm under the assumption fextreme 
needs for inter-shop coordination are derived in Section 6. We will see how the optimal 
structure depends upon some xogenous parameters characterizing the outside nvironment. 
In Section 7, some extensions and the implication of the model are discussed. Finally, 
Section 8provides concluding remarks. 
2. The Model 
Consider a two-tier hierarchical organization ofthe firm whose members are one top man-
ager (hereafter called top) and two subordinate shop managers 1 and 2. There is an 
uncertain environment represented by independent random variables X and Y, to which 
the firm has to adapt. For simplicity, assume X and Y are independently and Normally 
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distributed with E(X) = E(Y) = 0, Var(X) = ax, and Var(Y) = 4. We also use hx and 
by as precisions ofX and Y, respectively.8 
   There are four actions a1, a2, b1, and b2 that the subordinates must implement. The 
objective of the organization is to implement the actions to minimize the value of the loss 
function 1(a1, a2, b1, b2; x, y) which is given by 
             1(a1, a2, b1i b2; x, y) _ (a1 + a2 - x)2 + (b1 + b2 - y)2 
                           +tlA(a1 - a2)2 + ILB(b1 - b2)2 
                       +/\[(a1+a2)-(b1 +b2)]2 
where µA, Y B, and A are nonnegative constants.9 
   To give some simple interpretation to this loss function, imagine that X represents the 
condition of the machines in shop A and Y represents the machine condition in shop B. 
(Or similarly, we can imagine that two random variables represent economic conditions of 
two industries A and B.) The first two terms of the function show that the firm tries to 
detect the true condition of the machines in each shop as closely as possible. Each of these 
terms represents a direct effect of the shop-specific actions on each shop. On the other 
hand, the term with / A or 11B does not depend upon the realization of the state variable. 
Instead, it shows that two actions a1 and a2 (or b1 and b2) implemented in shop A (shop 
B) are more desirable if they are closer to one another because of some economies of scale 
or synergy effect. This term might be called an intra-shop coordination term. Finally, the 
last term shows that the closer are the joint actions a1 + a2 in shop A and b1 + b2 in shop 
B the better the performance of the firm because of interdependence between shops. This 
term represents inter-shop coordination. 
   Each shop manager implements two actions. The task structure of the organization 
assigns two actions to each manager. Essentially, there are two structures we should con-
sider. The specialized task structure assigns actions a1 and a2 to subordinate 1, and b1 and 
b2 to subordinate 2. Under this structure, each subordinate specializes in one shop, and 
there is no way he can influence the direct effect of the other shop. The other structure, 
  8 Unless otherwise noticed
, the same notations are used throughout the paper: For a 
random variable V, the variance and the precision are written as w = 1/hv. Also the 
realization of V is written by the small letter v. 
 9 This loss function is the same as one used by Green and Laffont (1986) if A = 0. 
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called the nonspecialized task structure, assigns actions ai and bi to subordinate i, so that 
the direct effect of each shop is determined by the joint actions of two subordinates and 
each shop manager can provide some help to the other shop manager. These two task 
structures may have clearer interpretation when applied to two industries instead of two 
shops. Suppose that X and Y represent some uncertain economic conditions of industries 
A and B, respectively, and that a1 and b1 are, say, marketing-related actions and a2 and 
b2 production-related actions. Then the term with µA or µB represents an inter-functional 
effect; for each industry, the firm needs to coordinate the marketing decision and the pro-
duction decision. In this example, if the nonspecialized task structure is adopted, the firm 
has a U-form (unitary form) structure. Each subordinate is a representative of a functional 
division. On the other hand, if the specialized task structure is adopted, the firm has a 
M-form (multidivisional form) structure. In this case, each subordinate specializes in one 
of two industries.'0 
    Now I describe the information structure of the organization. There are two stages in 
information processing in the firm: the information acquiring stage and the communication 
stage. In the information acquiring stage, each subordinate spends time acquiring informa-
tion concerning X and Y, and at the end of the information stage, subordinate i receives 
signals Xi = X + ci and Yi = Y + qi, where Ei and rqi are Normally distributed with mean 
zero and are independent of the other variables. The precisions h,i and h,7i depend on his 
information processing capacities pi and qi and time allocations as follows: 
                       hei = piti and h,7i = qi(1 - ti) 
where ti is the time used by shop manager i for gathering and processing information about 
X. It is assumed that he can use one unit time for information acquiring, so that the time 
1 - ti is used for information about Y. Abler subordinates are assumed to be more costly, 
with the cost, called the information capacity cost, taking.the linear form Kcpi + Kcgi 
where Kc > 0 is a constant marginal cost of information processing capacities. This cost 
comes from either training subordinates to have desirable abilities or from searching for 
and paying subordinates with better information processing capacities. 
 10 I am grateful to Mace Mesters for reminding me of the task assignment problem and 
suggesting this interpretation. 
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   Then in the communication stage, communication occurs. Communication patterns 
depend on the coordination system. There are two feasible coordination systems, the 
hierarchical coordination system and the horizontal coordination system, one of which 
the top manager chooses. The two coordination systems differ in where communication 
channels are installed and in who makes the action choices. One communication channel 
makes one-way communication possible. For example, if subordinate 1 wants to send some 
reports to top, one communication channel is necessary between subordinate 1 and top. 
Two-way communication needs two channels. (But see below, especially footnote 11.) The 
cost of installing the communication channel- can be' ignored since we compare two systems 
both of which require two communication channels. In the model analyzed, there is no 
restriction in dimensionality of reports: Subordinate i can send the values of both Xi 
and Yi. However, it may be required to write some summary reports before sending to 
top. This idea can be formalized by assuming limited dimensionality in communication 
channels. Some implications oflimited dimensionality will be discussed in Section 7. 
The hierarchical coordination system. Figure 1 shows the information flow and the ac-
tion choice under, the hierarchical system. In this coordination system, two communication 
channels are installed between top and two subordinates. Each channel isused by each sub-
ordinate to send his message totop." Each subordinate i sends his information Xi and Yi 
to top. We assume that top has exogenously given abilities to understand the information 
concerning both X and Y, but that more attention to reading reports from shop managers 
leads to more delay in her decision making and so creates more costs. We formalize this 
simply as follows. Top observes random variables of the form Xi + 9i and Yi + vi where 
9i and vi are independently and Normally distributed with mean zero and the precisions 
ri = ptx, and si = Pty,, respectively. We assume that top has the information processing 
capacity p, which is exogenously given and is the same regardless of information sources. 
 11 It is assumed that the top's suggestion about he actions can be sent to subordinates 
without using communication channels. Following Arrow (1974), I assume that it is the 
difficulty in communicating complex information that makes the limited rationality of the 
decision makers matter. It is assumed that there is no difficulty in just understanding 
and following the orders. (However, as is discussed in Section 1, shop managers cannot 
understand the information content of the orders.) As Arrow states, authority economizes 
transmission and handling of information by using the orders instead of retransmitting the 
information collected. 
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She determines tx,, the time spent for the subordinate i's report about X, and ty,, the time 
for i's report about Y, for each i. For simplicity, we regard ri and si as choice variables, 
instead of tX, and ty;. The higher is ri or si, the more precisely top can understand the 
message from subordinate i concerning X or Y, respectively, since she spends more time 
in reading it. However, higher precisions lead to more costs of delay in decision making. 
We assume that these costs are linear in time spent for reading reports. Let KD be the 
constant marginal cost of delay. Then the costs are of the form KDtX: + KDtY; . Since we 
use ri and si as decision variables, we rewrite the linear cost function as KDri + KDsi with 
KD KDIp > 0 called a constant marginal decoding cost. Higher KD reflects more need 
in quick decision making, given information processing capacities of top fixed. 
   Let L(a1, a2, b1, b2 I Z1, Z2) be defined by 
            L(a1, a2, b1, b2 I Z1, Z2) = E[l(a1, a2, b1, b2; X, Y) I Z1, Z2} 
where Zi = (Xi + Bi, Yi + vi). Then in the hierarchical system, top chooses the decision 
structure a1, a2i 01, and /32, which are the functions of Z1 and Z2, such that for each Z1 
and Z2, 
   (a1(Z1,Z2),a2(Z17Z2)7P1(Z1,Z2),02(Z1,Z2)) E argmin L(a1,a2,bi,b2 I Z1,Z2).                                                                      a,a2,bi,b2 
Note that the choice of the task structure does not matter under the hierarchical system, 
since all the actions are chosen by top and the subordinates have limited rationality in 
understanding subtle messages. 
The horizontal coordination system. Figures 2a and 2b show the information flow and 
the action choice under the horizontal system with nonspecialized task structure and with 
specialized task structure, respectively. In the horizontal system, communication channels 
are installed between two subordinates. Each channel sends amessage from one subordinate 
to the other. Subordinate .1sends X1 and Y1 to subordinate 2, using one channel, and 
subordinate 2 sends X2 and Y2 to subordinate 1, using the other channel. Similar to 
top in the hierarchical system, each shop manager faces the tradeoff between benefits of 
better decision and costs of delay in decision making. Subordinate i observes the signal 
Zj = (Xj + Oj, Yj + vj) (i # j). The cost of delay in his decision making is assumed to be of 
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the form KD(pi)rj + KD(gi)sj where the marginal cost KD(.) > 0 is a decreasing function 
and rj (s j) is the precision with which the manager i reads the report from manager j 
concerning X (Y, respectively). Higher rj means that manager i spends more time in 
reading the report concerning X. As his information processing capacity pi concerning X 
is higher, he can understand the report concerning X from subordinate j more easily, so 
that the cost is less. After the interchange of information, each subordinate independently 
chooses his actions based on his original information and the signal received from the other 
subordinate. For example, when the nonspecialized task structure isadopted, subordinate 
i chooses the decision structure ai and /3i, both of which are the functions of Xi, Yi, and 
Zj, such that for a given decision structure aj and /ij of subordinate j, 
        (ai(Xi,Yi,Zj),Pi(Xi,Yi,Z7)) E argminLi(ai,bi;aj,/3j (XilYijZj) (1) 
                                                       a8,bi 
for all Xi, Yi, and Zj, (i, j = 1, 2, and i 0 j), where 
 Li(ai, bi; aj, (3j Xi,Y=, Z1) = E[l(ai, aj(X.7,Yj) Zi), bi,13 (X.7,Yj, Zi); X1 Y) ~ Xi,Yi, Zj]. 
Here Li(ai, bi; aj, /3j I Xi,Yi, Zj) is the expected value of the loss function when subordi-
nate i chooses action ai and bi, given his signals (Xi, Yi, Zj) and the decision structure of 
subordinate j, aj and /3j. Note that each subordinate i cannot exactly infer the actions 
implemented bythe other subordinate j from his available information. Therefore, subor-
dinate i has some conjectured decision structure of subordinate j, and responds optimally 
to it. We adopt the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium as an appropriate solution concept under 
the horizontal system, where the decision structure (a1, a2, 01, 02) is an equilibrium if the 
equation (1) is satisfied for i, j = 1, 2. In equilibrium, each subordinate has the correct con-
jectures concerning the other subordinate's decision structure.12 Similar arguments apply 
to the case of the specialized task structure. 
   The decision problems inthe model are summarized asfollows. There are six decisions 
the organization has to make: (i) the coordination system; '(ii) information processing ca-
pacities Ic = (P1, P2, q1, q2); (iii) the precisions with which subordinates or the top manager 
 12 This solution is equivalent to the person-by-person satisfactory rule in team theo-
retic terms. Thus, we can alternatively define the optimal decision structure (under the 
horizontal system with nonspecialized task structure) as the rules ai and /3i for i = 1, 2, 
which top specifies ex ante to minimize the unconditional expected gross loss, given by 
E[l(a1(X1,Y1, Z2),f31(X1,Y1, Z2), a2(X2,Y2, Z1),/32(X2,Y2) Z1); X,Y)]• 
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read reports, denoted by ID = (rl, r2i s1, s2); (iv) the time allocation by the subordinates 
IT = (h, t2); (v) the task structure; and (vi) the decision structure. We call the decisions 
(ii)-(iv) the information structure of the firm13 and denote I = (Ic, ID, IT); once this and 
the task structure are fixed for each coordination system, (vi) is solved as above. The 
optimal solutions of (i)-(vi) are called the optimal organization structure. 
   The analysis of the model follows the standard procedure of the theory of teams: 
First, for each coordination system, information structure, and task structure, we derive 
the optimal decision structure. Then we derive the optimal information structure, and 
finally the task structure and the optimal coordination system (if possible).
3. Preliminary Analysis 
The abstract model presented in the last section is more complicated than it looks. In 
particular, it is very difficult to obtain even the optimal decision structure explicitly with 
A as a parameter. Therefore we examine two extreme cases A = 0 and A -* +oo. The first 
case corresponds to the case where inter-shop coordination is unnecessary. For example, 
this case will apply if the firm diversifies into two completely unrelated industries. The 
second case is that the inter-shop coordination is crucial as in the production system with 
assembly lines. The organization must determine the decision structure such that the A-
term almost always becomes zero. In these two cases, the tradeoff between two coordination 
structures becomes quite simple, as is shown below. 
   In the rest of this section, we provide some preliminary analysis of each coordination 
system in the two extreme cases of the inter-shop coordination term. The main results are 
that when A = 0, the optimal organization structure is the horizontal coordination system 
with the specialized task structure, while when A --* -boo, this system is dominated by the 
hierarchical system for each information structure. Therefore, in the case where inter-shop 
coordination is extremely important, we can concentrate on the comparison between the 
hierarchical system and the horizontal system with the nonspecialized task structure, which 
will be conducted in the following sections. 
 13 The pattern of communication channels is determined by the choice of the coordination 
system, so that it is not included in the information structure. 
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   First consider the horizontal coordination system. Suppose that the specialized task 
structure is adopted so that subordinate 1 chooses a1 and a2, and subordinate 2 selects b1 
and b2. Then the firm can ignore the µA-term and the µB-term by setting a = a1 + a2, 
b = b1 + b2; and ai = a/2 and bi = b/2, without affecting the value of the other terms. That 
is, the firm can resolve coordination within each shop completely. The serious disadvantage 
of this system becomes clear as A takes a very high value because a and b are selected by 
different players independently. In particular, when A --* +00, the expectation of the A-term 
is zero if and only if, in equilibrium, 
         a,(X1) Yi,Z2)+a2(X1,Y1,Z2) _ /31(X2.,Y2,Z1)+02(X2,Y2,Z1) 
holds for almost all possible values of the signals observed by the shop managers. This 
is possible only when they set a1 + a2 and /31 + /32 to some same constant action almost 
everywhere. Clearly this is not desirable in view of the direct effect. Thus, when the 
coordination across hops is extremely important, he performance of the horizontal system 
with the specialized task structure will be very poor. 
   On the other hand, under the horizontal system with nonspecialized task structure, 
the intra-shop coordination terms become zero if and only if the decision structure of each 
subordinate is independent of all his information, by logic similar to above. Therefore, 
the performance will be quite bad as ILA or µB takes very high values. However, when 
A.---* +00, the firm can set the expectation of the A-term to zero. Subordinate i can choose 
his actions such as ai = ,3i and still can utilize his on-the-spot information for his decision 
making. Hence the nonspecialized task structure under the horizontal system is likely to 
perform very well if A --+ +oo and ILA and 1B are small. 
   Finally, -consider the hierarchical coordination system. Under this system, as with 
the horizontal system with the specialized structure, the firm can always zero out the 
infra-shop coordination terms, by ordering the shop managers to take the same actions for 
almost all messages received by top. In addition, since all the actions are chosen by the top 
manager, a very high value of A will not be so harmful as in the horizontal system with the 
specialized task structure. In fact, when A --~ +00, the firm enables the expectation of the 
inter-shop coordination term to be zero by setting a1(•) + a2 (•) = /31(•) +02 (-) for each pair 
of messages received, without affecting the intra-coordination terms. Therefore at least in 
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the two extreme cases considered, the disadvantage of the hierarchical coordination system 
comes solely from the fact that the on-the-spot information is not available to top. 
   The main result of this section is summarized in the following theorem. 
THEOREM 1. (i) If A = 0, the optimal organization structure isthe horizontal coordination 
system with the specialized task structure and the information structure such that each 
shop manager specializes in the information source only relevant to his shop and that no 
horizontal communication ccurs. (ii) If A --+ +oo, then for all information structures, the 
hierarchical coordination system is at least as good as the horizontal coordination system 
with the specialized task structure. 
   This theorem is proved by the following three lemmas. 
LEMMA 1. Suppose A = 0. Then under the horizontal coordination system with the 
specialized task structure, the optimal information structure Z = (Ic, ID, IT) is given by 
IC = (pl, 0, 0, q2), ID = (0, 0, 0, 0), and IT = (1,0) where p1 = max[(Kc)-1/2 - hx, 0] and 
q2 = max[(Iic)-1/2 - hy, 0]. 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
    The information structure in the assertion means that subordinate 1 specializes in
attending to X and subordinate 2 specializes inY, and there is no communication between 
them. In the Appendix, it is shown that these capacities are optimal even under the 
assumption that ICD = 0, that is, there is no cost of communication between subordinates. 
Then the expected gross loss under the optimal decision structure is Var(X I X1i X2) + 
Var(Y Y1, Y2) . The assertion in Lemma 1 states that under the optimal information 
structure, the expected gross loss is of the form Var(X ( X1) + Var(Y Y2). That is, at the 
optimum, X2 and Y1 do not convey any information because manager 1 (manager 2) has no 
information processing capacity concerning Y (X) and so,1 - t1 = 0 (t2 = 0, respectively). 
    In the proof in the Appendix, we see that top chooses the information processing capac-
ities to achieve atarget level of the posterior variance for each shop-specific environment. 
Under the optimal capacities, this target level is given as Kc for both shops. If the prior 
variance of a shop exceeds this level, top invests in the capacities ofthe shop manager and 
reduces the variance. If the prior variance is no higher than the target level, top does not 
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try to reduce the variance further, so that there is no investment in information processing 
capacities. Communication between subordinates does not occur since they make decisions 
only relevant to their own job shop and they specialize in different information sources. 
   If the subordinates specialize inthe same information source (say, X), they may reduce 
the variance of X, but to the same target level Kc while they cannot reduce the variance of 
Y. Therefore, specialization in the same information source is no better than specialization 
in different information sources. 
   Finally, suppose that each subordinate attends to both information sources. Then 
communication is valuable, and by horizontal communication and by the assumption of no 
costs of delay, they can share their information completely. However, under this nonspecial-
ization, the target levels of the posterior variances are given by Kc l t and KC I (1 - t) 
where t = t1 = t2. Hence, the nonspecialization is inferior to the specialization in differ-
ent information sources. Here limited attention matters. In fact, if there were no time 
constraint and subordinates' information processing capacities could be used as the preci-
signs of the noise terms (that is, pi = hE; and qi = h,,; for all i), then nonspecialization 
would perform as well as the specialization in different information sources (assuming that 
communication is costless). 
    Given the horizontal coordination system, the next lemma compares the specialized 
task structure (with the information structure in Lemma 1) to the nonspecialized task 
structure. 
LEMMA 2. Consider the horizontal coordination system. Then when a = 0, the specialized 
task structure with the optimal information structure as in Lemma 1 is at least as good as 
the nonspecialized task structure. 
PaooF: To give the greatest advantage to the nonspecialized task structure, suppose ,uA = 
µB = 0 and no costs of delay. Since the optimal information structure under the specialized 
task structure has no communication, this assumption of no decoding cost does not give 
any advantage to the specialized structure. Then under the nonspecialized task structure, 
managers choose the decision structure satisfying 
                a1(X1, X2) + a2(X1, X2) = E[X I X1, X2] 
                 /31(Yl,Y2) +,82(Y1,Y2) = E[Y I Y1,Y2]. 
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Then the expected gross loss is of the form Var(X X1, X2) + Var(Y I Y1, Y2) under this 
decision structure. However, this is the same as the expected gross loss under the specialized 
task structure under the assumption of no decoding cost. Hence the nonspecialized task 
structure is no better than the specialized one. 
   It follows from the proof that if the decoding cost were zero, the subordinates could 
share the same information, so that the performance of the nonspecialized task structure 
would be the same as that of the specialized one, even if µA or µB is strictly positive. 
This can be done by making the subordinates pecialize in different information sources, 
by choosing the decision structure satisfying the equations in the proof, and by setting 
al - a2 and 01 - 02 for almost all values of the random variables. However, when there 
are positive decoding costs, this arrangement is no longer available, so that when ELA > 0 
or µB > 0, the nonspecialized task structure is strictly inferior to the specialized one.14 
   Finally, the following lemma compares the hierarchical system to the horizontal system 
with the specialized task structure. 
LEMMA 3. (i) Suppose A = 0. Then for each information structure, the horizontal coor-
dination system with the specialized task structure is at least as good as the hierarchical 
system. (ii) Suppose A -f +oo. Then for each information structure, the hierarchical co-
ordination system is at least as good as the horizontal system with the specialized task 
structure. 
PROOF: (i) Given an information structure, when A = 0, the optimal decision structure 
under the horizontal system with the specialized task structure solves 
          man E[(a - X)2 IX1, Y1, Z2] + min E[(b - Y)2 IX2, Y2, Z1]. 
On the other hand, the decision structure under'the hierarchical system solves 
            mien{E[(a - X)2 I Z1, Z2] + E[(b - Y)2 I Z1I Z2]}. 
 14 When µA = µB = 0
, even if communication is costly, the nonspecialized structure 
can achieve the same performance as the specialized one because the optimal capacities 
are specialization in different information sources. That is, the following decision structure 
achieves this: al (X1) = E(X X1), 02(y2) = E(Y Y2), and a2 - /31 = 0. This deci-
sion structure shows that even under the nonspecialized task structure, each subordinate 
specializes in one of two shops and does not influence the other shop. 
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iClearly the former system is more "informative," so that the horizontal system with the 
specialized task structure is at least as good as the hierarchical system. (ii) As is discussed 
above, when A - -boo, the optimal decision structure under the horizontal system with the 
specialized task structure either has to ignore all the information and set to the constant 
a - E(X) = 0 and (3 E(Y) = 0, or has to choose the decision structure such as 
a2 = -a1 and /32 . -,Q1. It is easily seen that the optimal decision structure under this 
second condition leads to ai - 0 and (3i - 0 for i = 1, 2, so that. again the subordinates have 
to ignore all the information. However, under the hierarchical system, top can zero out 
the A-term without ignoring the information Z1 and Z2 by setting a(Z1, Z2) = ,3(Z1, Z2). 
Hence the hierarchical system is more informative and at least as good as the specialized 
task structure under the horizontal system. 
   Theorem 1(i) follows from Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 (i). Theorem 1 (i) is very intuitive. 
It states that if the firm diversifies into two completely unrelated industries, the optimal 
organization structure isthe M-form where ach manager specializes in his division and the 
information source specific to his division. As Williamson (1975, 1985) states, the M-from 
is better than the U-form because the former can improve coordination by "grouping the 
operating parts into separable entities within which interactions are strong and between 
which they are weak (1985, p.283)." And the M-form is better than the hierarchical sys-
tem since operating decisions are resolved at the divisions, which reduces the information 
overload of top. Of course, this result holds because the coordination across industries is 
unnecessary (A = 0). As A is higher, interactions between divisional units become stronger, 
and the advantage of the M-form may be canceled out by its disadvantage in inter-divisional 
coordination.15 
   On the other hand, Theorem 1 (ii) (which follows directly from Lemma 3 (ii)) states 
that when A -+ ±oo, we can exclude the horizontal system with the specialized task struc-
ture from consideration in order to derive the optimal organization structure. In the rest of 
this paper, we focus on the comparison between the hierarchical system and the horizontal 
system with the nonspecialized task structure under the assumption A -~ +oo. Hereafter, 
we assume that the horizontal system has always the nonspecialized task structure. 
   Before starting the analysis, we adopt the following assumptions for simplification. 
 15 A typical example of this is that autonomous activities of two related product divisions 
sometimes cause the problem that they produce the same kinds of products and compete 
with each other in the market. 
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ASSUMPTION (A-1). µA = µB = ,a and a2 = a2 = a2 = 1/h. 
ASSUMPTION (A-2). For all r > 0, KD(r) --> +oo. That is, under the horizontal coordi-
nation system, no horizontal communication occurs between two subordinates. 
   Assumption (A-1) is purely for simplicity of the analysis. We assume that two shops 
are symmetric in the sense that they have the same prior variance and that they have the 
same degree of importance of coordination within shop. The implication of relaxing this 
assumption is straightforward. 
   Solving even the optimal decision structure under the horizontal system with inter-
change of information isvery difficult. Therefore we adopt Assumption (A-2) and consider 
the "pure" decentralized coordination system. (A-2) states that interchange of informa-
tion and understanding the reports under the horizontal system will overload the managers 
prohibitively. Notice that this assumption gives the hierarchical system the best possible 
chance of being superior to the horizontal system, since permitting communication between 
subordinates always improves the performance of the horizontal system. I will discuss in-
tuitively in Section 7 how the results change if interchange of information is allowed.
4. The Hierarchical Coordination System 
Now we start the analysis of the case of .\ -+ +oo with the hierarchical system. As 
is discussed in Section 2, the ,u-terms are zero in the optimum under the hierarchical 
coordination system. However, since a -~ +oo, it is necessary tosatisfy a1 + a2 = b1 + b2 for 
each pair of messages Z1 and Z2. Therefore, top chooses a = a1 + a2, given an information 
structure, to minimize L(a, a Z1, Z2) = E[(a - X)2 + (a - Y)2 ( Z1, Z2] for each Z1 and 
Z2. The optimal decision structure, denoted by aH, is given by the following:, 
             aH(Z1, Z2) = 1E[X I Z1, Z2] + 1 E[Y I Z1, Z2]. (2) 
                      2 2 
If there were no need in coordinating among shops, the optimal decision structure would 
be clearly a(Z1, Z2) = E[X Z1, Z2] and ,@(Z1, Z2) = E[Y Z1, Z2]. Hence the optimal 
structure aH is the convex combination of these two structures. The optimal gross loss 
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LH(I) is given by 
       LH(Z) = E[L(aH(Z1, Z2), aH(Z17 Z2) I Z1, Z2)] 
                                            (3) 
           = 1 {Var(X) + Var(X I Z1, Z2) + Var(Y) + Var(Y I Z1, Z2)}. 
             2-
Then top chooses the optimal information structure I which minimizes the expected net 
loss LH(Z) + Kc ~i_1(pi +qi) + KD E2 1(ri + si). The main result in this ection is the 
following. 
THEOREM 2. Suppose A -+ +oo and (A-I). Then, under the hierarchical system, the 
optimal information structure is the specialization i  different information sources. That 
is, one subordinate, say subordinate 1,specializes in X (p1 > 0, q1 = 0, and t1 = 1) and 
the other subordinate (subordinate 2)in Y (p2 = 0, q2 > 0, and t2 = 0). 
   The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to that of Lemma 1. The procedure is to compare the 
specialization in different information sources with the specialization in the same informa-
tion . source and with the nonspecialization. The only difference from the proof of Lemma 
1 is that we utilize the following lemma to compute the optimal information processing 
capacities given nonspecialization. 
LEMMA 4. Suppose (A-I). If the optimal information processing capacities under the 
hierarchical system make subordinates generalists in the sense that pi > 0 and qj > 0 for 
i = 1, 2, then their capacities atisfy p1 = q1 and P2 = q2, and they allocate their time 
evenly to each information source, that is, t1 = t2 = 1/2. 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
   This lemma simplifies the calculation of the optimal information processing capacities 
and time allocation if nonspecialized capacities are optimal. 
   Here we only show the derivation of the optimal information structure given the spe-
cialization in different information sources. Note that when subordinates are specialists, 
the message from each subordinate to top is one-dimensional. He sends the report con-
cerning what he specializes in. Hence, we can denote Z1 = X1 + 01 and Z2 = Y2 + v2. We 
suppose without loss of generality that subordinate 1 specializes in X and subordinate 2 to 
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Y. When the subordinates specialize in different information sources as such, the expected 
gross loss is of the form 
     LH(Z) = 1(h-1 + hy 1) + 1 {Var(X IZ1) + Var(Y Z2)) 
           2 2 
                                                             -1 -1          1(hX1 +h Y ) + 1{(hx+ p1r  + (hy +12,12 
             2 2 p1 + r1 q2 + s2 
Notice h,1 = p1 and h,,2 = q2 since t1 = 1 - t2 = 1. Then top chooses the information 
structure to minimize the expected net loss LH(Z) + Ii c(p1 + q2) + Ii D( r1 + S2)- It can be 
shown that this objective function is strictly convex in (p1, q2i r1, s2 ), so that the first-order 
conditions are necessary and sufficient. The first-order conditions for p1 > 0 and r1 > 0 
are given by
                                                -2 2 
r                 hx+ 1 1 r1 ) = 2Kc 
                         p1 + r1 p1 + r1 
                                                -2 2                hx+ p1 r  p1 ) =2ID. 
                         p1 + r1 p1 + r1 
From two equations in (4), we obtain 
                           kc 
                            r1 = k Pi 
D where ki = I i for i = C, D. Therefore 
                               r1 kc 
                             p1 + r1 k 
where k = kc + kD. Substituting (5) and (6) into the first equation in (4) yields 
k 
                  hx + p1 rr = hx -}- k p1 = 1 
                         p1 + 1 vF2 k 
By (7), (5), and the usual complementary sl ckness conditions forcorner solutions, 
optimal values ofp1 and r1, denoted byp2 and ri, are as follows. 
                 Pi = max [kc1((v) -1 - khx) ,0] 
                 r1 = max [kD1((V2 ) -1 - khx), 0]. 
By the same procedure, we obtain 
                  q2 = max[kc1((vr2)-1 - khy), 0] 
                 S2 = max [kD1((/) -1 - khy), 0]. 








The optimal information structure isgiven by Z* = (p1, 0, 0, q2 i r1, 0, 0, s2;1, 0). Let CH(I) 
be the total costs of information processing capacities and decoding. Then 
       LH(Z*) = 2 (hX1 + hY1) + 2{min [v~_2k, hX1 ] +min [V2-k, hy1 ] }
                                                (10)
       CH(I*) = max[k((v)-1 - khX),0] + max[k((v)-1 - khy),0]. 
   As in the optimal information structure- in the last section, the firm seeks a target 
level, given by k, for each shop. When the prior variance is higher than this, top invests 
in information processing capacities of shop managers and spends time reading reports 
from them, while when the prior variance is no higher than the target level, she makes no 
investment. 
    When the subordinates specialize in the same information source, the target level is 
the same. Since they can reduce the variance of only one shop, this is inferior to the 
specialization in different information sources.16 When nonspecialization is chosen, the 
target level of the posterior variance is larger than that under the specialization because of 
limited attention. 
    For later references, we summarize the results in the following corollary. 
COROLLARY 1. Under Assumption (A-1) and A -} +oo, the optimal information structure 
under the hierarchical system is given by ZH = (pH, 0107 pH; rH, 0, 0, rH; 1, 0) with 
                 pH = max [kc1((V2) _1 - kh), 0]                                                (11)
                  rH = max [kD1 ((v2) _1 - kh) ,0]. 
The optimal values of the expected gross loss, the information costs, and the expected net 
loss are given by 
                       LH = h-1 + min [/k, h-1] 
                  CH = max [k (/ - 2kh) , 0] (12) 
                 LH + CH = h-1 + min [2k (V2- - kh), h-1]. 
 16 This result partially depends upon the linearity of the decoding costs. If there were 
scale economies such as learning effects, so that top could read two summary reports con-
cerning the same information source faster than reading two reports of different sources, 
then the specialization in the same information source might be better. 
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   When h< (Jk) -1, the firm invests in the information capacities of both subordinates, 
so that LH = h-1 + \k < 2h-1 and CH = k (V2- - 2kh) > 0. Note that he target level 
/ k does not depend on the prior precision h. In the next section, we will see that his is 
not necessarily true under the horizontal system. Also CH is linearly decreasing in h. Hence 
the expected net cost is decreasing in the prior precision. The higher the prior precision 
                                       k) , is, the lower information c sts are quired to achieve t e targ t. When  > (\ 1 
the firm does not accumulate any resource in subordinates since the prior variances of the 
environment are sufficiently low. Therefore the expected net loss is the same as the sum 
of the prior variances, 2h-1. The effect of the capacity cost and the decoding cost can be 
easily seen, too. An increase in these costs reduces the critical level of the prior precision, 
beyond which the firm makes no investments, and so increases the target level. Therefore 
the expected net loss also increases. 
5. The Horizontal Coordination System 
The optimal decision structure under the horizontal coordination system is more compli-
cated since, as is seen in Section 3, in the optimum, the y-term is not zero. Also a1 and b1, 
and a2 and b2 are independently selected by subordinates 1 and 2, respectively, who share 
the information imperfectly. 
    Since A -+ +oo, the decision structure has to be chosen such that the A-term is zero. 
Under the horizontal system, this can be done by setting, for each i, ai = ,Qi for almost all 
values of the signals. 
    We can derive the optimal structure for every value of y under Assumption (A-2) using 
the well-known result in team theory that the optimal decision function of each subordinate 
is linear in the signals he observes under the assumptions of Normal distributions and a 
quadratic loss function. (See Marschak and Radner, 1972.) The optimal decision structure 
is of the form 
                    1 (1 +µ)hx - (1 - lL)hxhx             ai(Xi, Yi) = 2 (1 
+ µ)2h2 - (1 - IL)2hx,hx2 E[X I Xi]                                               (13) 
                  + 1 (1 + p)h 7 - (1 µ)hyhy, E[Y I Yi]                       2(1+
µ)2h2 -(1-/ )2hy,hY2 
where i 5 j. Because ofserious need for inter-shop coordination, each decision structure de-
pends on the information concerning both shops, Xi and Yi. One simple observation s that 
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when u goes to infinity, all the actions go to zero. When the coordination within each shop 
is extremely important, the firm needs to achieve a1 - a2. Under the horizontal system, 
however, this is possible only when both subordinates ignore almost all their information, 
so that they simply set a1(-) = a2 (.) = 2 E(X) + 2E(Y) = 0 almost everywhere. Clearly in 
this case, the hierarchical system works better since top can use the noisy messages from 
subordinates as well as achieve a1 - a2. 
   The optimal expected gross loss is, by tedious calculations, obtained as 
       L I = -h-1 + h-1 1 _ (1 + µ)(hx, + hx2)hx - 2(1 - µ)hxl hx2     ( ) 2 X X (1 
+ µ)2h2 - (1 - µ)2hx1hx2                                               (14)
          + 1 hY1 -}-hY1 1- (1 + u)(hy, + hy2 )hy - 2(1 - ,a)hy, hY2 
-
         2 (1 + )2h2                                             - (1- l-1)2hy1hy2                                          Y ) 
   By Assumptions (A-1) and (A-2), the problem is to obtain the optimal information 
processing capacities Ic = (p1, P2, q1, q2) and the time allocation IT = (t1, t2) to minimize 
L(Z)+Kc Ei -1(pi+qi). If we obtain the interior solution (pi > 0, qi > 0 and ti E (0, 1) for 
all i), then the optimal information processing capacities involve nonspecialization. Oth-
erwise, the optimal capacities involve specialization either in the same information source 
or in different information sources. Since the second-order conditions are complicated, it 
is not easy to derive the optimal information capacities and the optimal time allocation 
directly from (14). Therefore, we consider separately the three cases mentioned above: the 
case of nonspecialization (called the N-horizontal system), the case of the specialization in 
different information sources (the SD-horizontal system) and the case of the specialization 
in the same information source (the SS-horizontal system). Then we compare the perfor-
mance of the three cases to obtain the optimal information processing capacities and the 
optimal coordination system. 
3.5.1. The N-Horizontal System 
If the N-horizontal system is the optimal horizontal system, both subordinates are gener-
alists in the sense that pi > 0, qi > 0, and ti E (0, 1) for i = 1, 2. Though I am almost 
sure that the result similar to Lemma 4 (pi = qj and ti = 1/2) holds under -the horizontal 
system, I could not prove it formally.17 Thus, we take this as an assumption: 
 17 It is easily shown that pi = qj and ti = 1/2 satisfy the first-order necessary conditions. 
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iASSUMPTION (A-3). Suppose (A-1) and (A-2). If the optimal capacities under the hori-
zontal system are generalists, then assume pi = qi and ti = 1/2 hold for i = 1, 2. 
   By Assumption (A-3) and symmetry, the optimal capacities satisfy p1 = q1 = P2 = q2 
so that hx, = hy, = hX2 = hY2 holds. Let g(p, t) = hptl (h + pt) be the precision of 
the signal observed by a subordinate when p is his information processing capacity and he 
spends time t for information acquiring. Then (14) is rewritten as 
              Lw(1) = 1 1 _ 2g p, 2) + h-1              h (1
+µ)h+(1 p)g(p I , (15) 
             p+(1 +µ)h 
The firm chooses p to minimize LN(I) + 4Kcp. Clearly this objective function is strictly 
convex in p. Thus, by solving the first-order condition for the interior solution, we obtain 
the optimal information processing capacity pN under nonspecialization as follows. 
                     pN = max[Nm - mh, 0] (16) 
                           2kc 
where m = 1 + p. Hereafter we use m rather than p as the parameter representing the 
importance of the intra-shop coordination. Note that m > 1, and when m = 1, there is no 
need in coordination within each shop. The optimal values of the expected gross loss, the 
information cost, and the expected net loss are given as follows. 
                LN =min [2V/ mkc, h-11 + h-1 
                  CN = max [2vkc - 4mk2 h, 0] (17) 
                LN + CN = min [4v/m--kc - 4mkch, -1] + h-1 
    The firm pursues a target level 2/kc if the prior variance exceeds this level. Note 
that this target level is independent of the prior variance as is the target level under the 
hierarchical system. This is the most important consequence of knowledge sharing between 
the shop managers in our quadratic model: Since the shop managers can share information 
concerning both X and Y (partially), they can coordinate their actions uch as to set and 
achieve the target level independent of the prior precision. Because of this property, when 
h < (2f/mkc) -1, the expected net loss is linear and decreasing in h. What is different 
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from the hierarchical system, however, is that both this critical value of h and the target 
level depend upon the importance of the intra-shop coordination effect m. If m becomes 
larger, then the target level increases, so that the performance of the system becomes worse. 
The reason is that as the intra-shop coordination term is larger, on-the-spot information 
is less valuable: as we saw in Section 3, deeper knowledge makes it more difficult for each 
subordinate to take the similar actions. Therefore the firm makes less investments in the 
information processing capacities, which results in the higher expected net loss. 
3.5.2. The SD-Horizontal System. 
Here it is assumed that subordinate 1 specializes in X and subordinate 2 in Y. Then 
since ql = P2 = 0, hyl = 0 and hx2 = 0 hold in (13). Also E[X X2] = E(X) = 0 and 
E[Y ! Y1] = E(Y) = 0. Therefore, the optimal decision structure under the SD-horizontal 
system is given by 
        al D(X i) _ 2mE[X I X1] and a2 D(Y2) = mE[Y I Y2]. 
Since subordinate 2 specializes in Y, he does not receive any signal about X. Therefore, 
though he is involved in the management of job shop A as well as job shop B, his actions 
depend only on the information specific to job shop B. Then subordinate 1 chooses his 
actions by considering the tradeoff between the direct effect and the intra-shop coordina-
tion effect. If his action depends heavily on his on-the-spot information X1, then since 
subordinate 2 has no knowledge concerning X, coordination is very difficult, whence the 
performance will not be good. On the other hand, too much attention to the coordination 
within each shop loses the advantage of on-the-spot information. Therefore, the optimal 
action by subordinate 1 depends on m. As above, the higher m is, the lower is the weight 
on E[X I X1]. When the intra-shop coordination effect is more important, subordinate 1 
utilizes his on-the-spot information less. 
   Then by substituting hyl = hX2 = 0 into (14) and using (A-1) the optimal expected 
gross loss is given by 
                   LSD(Z) = 1 1 _ g(p, 1) + h-1 (18) 
                         h mh 
where g(p, 1) = hxl = hy2 = hp/(h + p) for p = pi = .Q2. Then the firm chooses p to 
minimize LSD(Z) + 2Kcp. The optimal information processing capacity pSD is obtained 
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as follows. 
                     pSD = max[( 2mkc)-1 - h, 0]. (19) 
Notice that pSD > 0 when h < ( 2mkC)-1. The optimal values of the expected gross loss, 
the information cost, and the expected net loss are given by 
              LSD = min 1 mh (m - 1 + 2mkC h) , h-1 -}- h-1 
            CSD = max 1 ( 2mkch - 2mk2 h2), 0 (20) 
                 mh 
       LSD +CSD = min mh (m - 1 + 2 2mkch - 2mkch2), h-1 + h-1 
Note that unless m = 1, the target level depends on the prior precision h, which is the im-
portant difference from the hierarchical system and the N-horizontal system. When m = 1, 
the coordination within each shop is unnecessary. Therefore as the prior precision decreases, 
the expected net loss increases only because of the linear increase in the information cost. 
However, under the specialization in different information sources, the information the sub-
ordinates obtain is stochastically independent, so that they share no knowledge and so they 
cannot resolve the intra-shop coordination at all. Thus, when m > 1, decreasing the prior 
precision results in increasing the expected net loss at an increasing rate. 
3.5.3. The SS-Horizontal System. 
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that both subordinates specialize in X. Then since 
ql = q2 = 0, hyl = hy2 = 0 holds in (13). In addition, E[Y I Y1] = E[Y I Y2] = E(Y) = 0. 
Therefore the optimal decision structure, under Assumptions (A-1) and (A-2), is given by 
           ass(X=) - 1 (1 + )2 - (1 - 2)hhxj E[X IX2] (21) 
                      2(1+/,1)2h2 -(1-µ) hx,hx2 
for i, j = 1, 2 and i # j. By symmetry (hx, = hx2 ), the optimal expected gross loss is 
obtained as 
             LSS(Z) = 1 1 _ 9(p, 1) + h-1 (22)                  h (1 
+ p)h + (1 - µ)9(p,1) 
for p = pl = p2. The firm chooses p to minimize LSS(I) + 2Kcp. The optimal capacity 
pSS under the SS-horizontal system is given by 
                pss =max 2 [!((v/kC)_1 2m- h)70 . (23) 
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The optimal values of the expected gross loss, the information cost, and the expected net 
loss are obtained as 
            LSS = min 2h [(i+ 2mkch), h-1 + h-1 
             CSS =max 2h ( 2mkc - 2mk2 h) , 0 (24) 
         LSS +CSS =min 2h (1 + 2 2mkch - 2mkch2), h-1 + h-1. 
   Under the SS-horizontal system, for all m, the target level in LSS depends on the 
prior variance. However, the reason for this is quite different from the reason under the 
SD-horizontal system. In(24), when h< ( 2mkc) -1, LSS is of the form 
                   LSS =2 ( 2mkc + h-1) +h-1 
The prior variance 1/h always appears in the parentheses not because the shop managers 
cannot share knowledge about Y but simply because they completely ignore the information 
source Y. Therefore, as h decreases, the expected net loss increases at an increasing rate 
if h < ( 2mkc) -1. However, since both subordinates focus on X and share knowledge 
about it, they can coordinate the part of their decision relevant to X very well: the "target 
level" related with this information source, given by 2mkc, is independent of h and is 
lower than either target level of the N-horizontal system or the SD-horizontal system. 
   In contrast to the hierarchical system, the horizontal system can have all the three 
kinds of information structures at the optimum, and which of them is the best depends 
upon exogenous parameters. In the next section, we examine this and derive the optimal 
coordination system.
6. Comparisons and the Optimal Organization Structure 
We compare the four systems derived in the last two sections by the optimal cost saving, 
which is defined as the expected net loss under no information (2h-1) minus the optimal 
value of the expected net loss (L + C) for each system. Let Si = 2h-1 - (Lt + C) be the 
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optimal cost saving for each system i = H, N, SD, SS. Then they are given as follows: 
            SH(h, k) = h-1(1 - vkh) 2S{h < (/k)-1 } 
          SN(h, m, kc) = h-1 (1 - 2,/-m-kch)2S{h < (2,/mkc)-1 } 
         SsD(h, m, kc) = (mh)-1( (25)                       (1 2mkch)2S{h < ( 2mkc)-1 } 
         Sss(h, m, kc) _ (2h)-1 (1 - 2mkch)2b{h < ( 2mkc)-1 } 
where S{ E} = 1 if E holds, and = 0, otherwise. 
   The graph of the optimal cost saving under each system as a function of h is drawn 
in Figures 3-6. Each graph has a similar shape: It is smooth, decreasing, and convex in 
h. Particularly, it is equal to zero when the prior precision is equal to or higher than its 
critical value, while if the prior precision is smaller than the critical level, the optimal cost 
saving is strictly increasing at an increasing rate as h decreases. The effect of m on the 
optimal cost saving is also shown in the figures. The optimal cost saving under the three 
horizontal coordination systems decreases as the importance of intra-shop coordination 
increases. Though not shown in the figures, the effect of an increase in the marginal cost of 
capacities or decoding is also straightforward. An increase in the marginal cost of decoding 
KD reduces the optimal cost saving under the hierarchical system. The increase in the 
marginal cost of capacities Kc reduces the optimal cost saving under each system. 
   Some ordering among four systems is easily established by-comparing the optimal cost 
saving of each system in (25). 
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose (A-1), (A-2), (A-3), and A --> +oo. 
(i) SN(h, m, kc) > SH(h, k) for all h if and only if m < k2/(2kc). 
(ii) SSD(h, m, kc) > SSS(h, m, kc) for all h and kc if and only if m < 2. 
   Assertion (i) shows that the ordering between the hierarchical system and the N-
horizontal system does not depends upon the prior precision. If m < k2 /(2k2 ), then for 
all h, the N-horizontal system isat least as good as the hierarchical system (strictly better 
for small h). Since this condition means 2v/'m-kc < ik, the N-horizontal system can save 
the loss by making investments in the capacities for higher precisions than the hierarchical 
system to achieve lower target levels. In addition, when the firm makes investments under 
both systems, the slope of the information cost function under the hierarchical system is 
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steeper, whence SN increases faster than SH as h decreases. If m > k2/(2kc), then for all 
h the hierarchical system is at least as good as the N-horizontal system since the former 
can save the loss for higher h in order to achieve a lower target, and the optimal saving 
SH increases faster than SN. Finally when m = k2/(2kc), the optimal cost saving of both 
systems coincides for all h, since the expected net losses coincide. 
   The disadvantage of the hierarchical system comes solely-from the fact that it cannot 
utilize on-the-spot knowledge held by the shop managers and that the top manager has 
to spend time to read their reports, which causes delay of decision making. A parameter 
associated with this cost of delay is given by kD. On the other hand, the disadvantage of
the N-horizontal system is due to imperfect intra-shop coordination, which is more serious 
the higher is m. Proposition 1 shows that the ordering of these two systems is determined 
by the comparison between these disadvantages only. 
    Why does the prior precision have no role in determining the order between these two 
systems? Because both of them can set and achieve target levels independently of the prior 
variance 1/h. In fact, the optimal values of the expected gross loss under these two systems 
have very similar forms. Under the hierarchical system, the firm incurs the costs of both 
information processing capacities and information decoding. By (6), the precision of the 
noise term in the signal observed by top is equal to pHrH/(pH + rH) = (kcl k)pH. Hence 
the expected gross loss under the hierarchical system is 
                                               -1 
                       LH = h + k pH + h-1 k 
The first term is the posterior variance obtained by top if she had an information processing 
capacity pH and attended to X for time kclk. The time 1 - (kclk) is left idle because of 
the loss due to limited attention of top. On the other hand, by (15), the expected gross 
loss under the N-horizontal system is 
                                               -1                   LN = (h+ 1 PN + h-1. 
M The first term is the posterior variance obtained if a manager with capacity pN attended 
to an information source for time 1/m. Though there is the positive µ-term under the 
N-horizontal system in addition to the direct effect erm, subordinates who have nonspe-
cialized capacities and allocate their time evenly to each information source can achieve 
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the same expected gross loss as if y = 0 and each subordinate specialized in different infor-
mation sources and spent ime 1/m only for his information source. The time (m - 1)/m 
is left idle, which represents the loss due to imperfect intra-shop coordination. 
   As an example, suppose kc = kD, so that both systems have the same information 
cost function 4Kcp. (Note pH = rH if kc = kD.) The critical value for m is given by 
k2 /(2k2) = 2. Then when m = 2, both LN and LH are given by (h+ 2p)-1 +h-1 . Therefore 
pH = pN holds, and they have the same optimal cost saving. When m < 2, under the 
N-horizontal system, the subordinates put more weight on each conditional expectation i
their decision structure in order to exploit he advantage of the on-the-spot information: the 
malcoordination due to more aggressive use of the on-the-spot information is less harmful. 
The loss of the N-horizontal system represented by the idle time above also decreases. 
Similarly, when m > 2, the weight on each conditional expectation i the optimal decision 
structure of the N-horizontal system decreases and the on-the-spot information is utilized 
less, because of the greater importance of the intra-shop coordination effect." 
    Assertion (ii), which compares theSD-horizontal system and the SS-horizontal system, 
is similar to assertion (i); the ordering does not depend on h. We can show that for each 
h < ( 2mkc)-1, the slope of SSD is steeper than that of SSS if m < 2 and is flatter if
m > 2. When m = 2, the optimal cost saving under both systems coincides. 
    To make clear the relation between these two systems, first consider the case that there 
is no intra-shop coordination term (m = 1). Then the SS-horizontal system is inferior to the 
SD-horizontal system because the SS-horizontal system cannot reduce the prior variance 
of the environment Y specific to shop B, so that the expected net loss increases drastically 
when h decreases. While the expected net loss of the SD-horizontal system also increases 
as h decreases, the firm can reduce the expected net loss partially to the target level 
independent of h, by attending to both information sources. Thus, LSD does not increases 
so fast as LSS does as h decreases. Without any need for intra-shop coordination, the 
SD-horizontal system uses on-the-spot information more efficiently than the SS-horizontal 
system. 
  18 When kD is different from kc, these systems are different in the information cost 
function as well as the expected gross loss. Therefore even when m = k2/(2kc), pN is not 
equal to pH. 
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   However, when the intra-shop coordination term is present (m > 1), this advantage of
the SD-horizontal system may be lost. Under the SD-horizontal system, each subordinate 
specializes in a different information source, while, under the SS-horizontal system, both 
subordinates specialize in the same information source. Therefore, the SS-horizontal system 
is better in coordinating the actions between the subordinates. Proposition 1 (ii) states 
that, under m < 2, the advantage ofthe SS-horizontal system in better coordination is not 
sufficient to offset he disadvantage in the inefficient use of the on-the-spot information, 
so that the SD-horizontal system is still better for all h. When m > 2, however, the 
coordination is important sufficiently to make the SS-horizontal system dominate the SD-
horizontal system for all h. 
    Other simple cases are when there is no intra-coordination term, that is, when m = 1, 
and when the intra-coordination effect is so important that m > k2 /k2 holds. The best 
organization structure does not depend on h in these cases as the following proposition 
shows.19
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose (A-1), (A-2), (A-3), and A --* +oo. 
(i) When m = 1, the optimal organization structure is the SD-horizontal coordination 
   system. 
(ii) When m > k2 /kc, the optimal organization structure isthe hierarchical coordination 
   system (with the optimal information structure in Corollary 1.) -
PROOF: (i) By Proposition 1,it is sufficient tocompare this system with the N-horizontal 
system. By (15), when m = 1, LN = (pN + h)-1 + h-1, while by (18), LSD = (pSD + 
h)-1 + h-1: They have the same form of the expected gross loss. However, the information 
cost side is different. While the N-horizontal system needs to invest in four information 
processing capacities P1, P2, q1, q2, the SD-horizontal system needs only two capacities p1
and q2. Thus, the SD-horizontal system isbetter than the N-horizontal system. (ii) When 
m > k2 /kc, the hierarchical system isbetter than the N-horizontal system by Proposition 
1. For the comparison with the SD-horizontal system or the SS-horizontal system, note 
that when m = k2 /kc, all of the hierarchical, SD-horizontal, nd SS-horizontal systems 
have the same critical value of h; the firm makes investments in the information structure 
only if the prior precision is smaller than that same critical value. However, the optimal 
 19 Of course
, if h is sufficiently high, no investment in the information structure is optimal, 
hence all systems are indifferent. 
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cost saving under the hierarchical system increases faster than under the other two systems. 
As we saw in the last section, the target level under the hierarchical system is independent 
of h, while the target levels under the other two are not. 
   When m E (1, k2l k2 ), the optimal organization structure depends on the prior pre-
cision as well as other parameters. To examine this case, for each i = SD, SS, define for 
m E [11k 2/k2 ], 
                 N2(m, kc) = sup{h > 0 I SN > SZ, SN > 0} 
                                                (26)
               HZ(m, kC, kD) = sup{h > 0 1 SH > S2, SH > 0} 
and 
                           NSD(m) kc) if m < 2 
                N(m, kc) _ 
                          Nss(m, kc) if m > 2 (2
7) 
                            HSD(m, kc, kD) if m < 2 
               H(m, kc, kD) _ 
                            Hss(m, kc, kD) if m > 2 
Figures 7 and 8 display how N(.) and H(.) are determined. By definition, the N-horizontal 
system is better than both the SD- and SS-horizontal systems if h < N(m) kc). Sim-
ilarly, the hierarchical system is better than both the SD- and SS-horizontal system if
h < H (m, kc, kD) . In Appendix, we provide the exact forms of N (.) and H (.) and show 
the following properties. 
LEMMA 5. N(.) and H(.) have the following properties for m E [1, k2lkC]. 
 (i) N(.) and H(.) are continuous in their arguments. 
(ii) N(1, kc) = H(1, kc, kD) = 0 and N(m, kc) = H(m, kc, kD) for m = k'/(2k c). 
(iii) H(m, kc, kD) = (/k)-1 form = k2/kc. 
(iv) N(.) is increasing and concave in m < 2, decreasing and convex in m > 2, and 
   decreasing in kc. 
(v) H(.) is increasing and concave in m < 2, increasing and convex in m > 2, and decreas-
   ing in kD. In addition, it is increasing in kc if m > 2, and is independent of kc if 
   m < 2. 
(vi) N(m, kc) > H(m, kc, kD) form < k2/(2k2) and N(m, kc) < H(m, kc, kD) form > 
  k2 /(2kc ). 
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 These properties are later used for figures concerning the optimal organization structure 
 and for comparative statics. 
     Now we can provide the optimal organization structure for all values of the parameters. 
 THEOREM 3. Suppose (A-1), (A-2), (A-3), and A -+ +oo. Then the optimal organization 
 structure is given as follows: 
1 
  (I) When m = 1, the SD-horizontal coordination system is optimal for h < (/kc) . 
1 
 (II) When m > k2/kc, the hierarchical coordination system is optimal for h < (/k) . 
 (III) Suppose m E (1, k2/k2 ). Then 
     (i) if m < k2/(2kc) and h < N(m, kc), the N-horizontal coordination system is
        optimal; 
     (ii) if m > k2/(2k2) and h < H(m, kc, kD), the hierarchical coordination system is 
         optimal; 
    (iii) if m < 2 and max[N(m, kc), H(m, kc, kD)] < h < ( 2mkc) -1, the SD-horizontal 
         coordination system is optimal; 
     (iv) if m > 2 and max[N(m, kc), H(m, kc, kD)] < h < ( 2r7zkc)-1, the SS-horizontal 
         system is optimal. 
                 _ k) no investment in the information struc- (IV) Forallm, ifh>max[( 2mkc)-1, (v/2-
     ture is optimal. 
  PROOF: Assertions (I) and (II) are by Proposition 2. Assertions i  (III) are by Proposition 
  1, the definition f N(.) and H (. ), and Lemma 5. For the last assertion (IV), note that 
  ( 2mkc) -1 > (/k) -1 if and only if m < k2 /k2 and both are equal for m = k2 /k2 . 
      Figures 9-11 summarize the optimal coordination system for each m > 1 and h. Figure 
  9 is the case k2/(2k2) <1. In this case, the decoding cost of top is so low compared to 
  the capacity cost (kD < (/ - 1) kc) that he N-horizontal system is never optimal. Also 
  since k2/kc < 2, there is no region where the SS-horizontal system is optimal. Either the 
  hierarchical system or the SD-horizontal system is optimal, depending on the parameters. 
  The figure shows that as the intra-shop coordination is more important, the region where 
  the SD-horizontal system is the best shrinks, while the region for the hierarchical system 
  expands. 
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   Figure 10 is the case that 1 < k2/(2kc) < 2. Though the decoding cost of top is still 
lower than the capacity cost (kD < kc), the N-horizontal system isoptimal for sufficiently 
low m and h. Also for relatively high m and h, the SS-horizontal system is optimal. The 
-region where the hierarchical system is optimal shrinks both from below and from right as 
the decoding cost increases. If the decoding cost is higher than the capacity cost, Figure 
10 changes toFigure 11, which is the case k2/(2kc) > 2. This condition isequivalent to 
kD > kc. Both regions for the N-horizontal system and the SS-horizontal system expand 
and the region for the hierarchical system continues to shrink as kD increases. 
    The figures show that given a prior precision h, the optimal regions for the hierarchi-
cal system and the SS-horizontal system are located above the regions for the N-horizontal 
system and the SD-horizontal system, respectively. We have provided explanation for this 
after Proposition 1: The hierarchical system and the SS-horizontal system have coordina-
tion advantage for high values of m while the N-horizontal system and the SD-horizontal 
system utilize on-the-spot knowledge more effectively. Another observation is that given 
m, the hierarchical system and the N-horizontal system are better than the SS-horizontal 
system and the SD-horizontal system for smaller prior precisions. This is because the hier-
archical system and the N-horizontal system can achieve their target levels independently 
of the prior precision. The target level under the SS-horizontal system or the SD-horizontal 
system is quite sensitive to the prior precision and increases drastically as h decreases, as 
is discussed in Section 5. The reason is that the SS-horizontal system completely ignores 
one aspect of the environment and the SD-horizontal system cannot coordinate between 
two shop managers at all. On the other hand, the SS-horizontal system and the SD-
horizontal system have information cost advantage when the prior precision is relatively 
high. Under these systems, the information costs are of the form 2Kc p for the common 
information processing capacity p. Each shop manager can specialize in one of two infor-
mation sources. However, when top invests in capacities under the hierarchical system, she 
also spends time for reports, which creates costs of delay. Thus, the information costs are 
2Kcp + 2KDr. Under the N-horizontal system, each shop manager spends his time for 
both information sources and so the information costs are of the form 4Kcp. Because of 
this, the SS-horizontal system and the SD-horizontal system enable top to start investing 
in information processing capacities for a higher prior precision level than the hierarchical 
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system and the N-horizontal system, and they retain this cost advantage for relatively high 
prior precisions. 
   Finally, consider comparative statics with regard to the capacity cost parameter kc. 
By Lemma 5 (v), increases in the capacity cost yield greater advantage to the hierarchical 
system. Since k'/(2k 2) is decreasing in kc, the region of the N-horizontal system shrinks 
from above. Note that by Lemma 5 (iv), this region also shrinks from right. Not only the 
hierarchical system, but also the SD- and SS-horizontal systems can have greater relative 
advantage over the N-horizontal system as kc increases: The marginal cost saving of the 
information processing capacity under the N-horizontal system is larger than any other 
system. This is because better capacities under the N-horizontal system do not hurt the 
intra-shop coordination so much as those under the other two horizontal systems and be-
cause the on-the-spot information, not available under the hierarchical system, is utilized in 
decision making. Similarly, compared with the hierarchical system, the SS-horizontal sys-
tem depends more on the information processing capacity, so that when kc increases, the 
region for the hierarchical system makes the region for the SS-horizontal system shrink from 
left. Interestingly, the boundary between the hierarchical system and the SD-horizontal sys-
tem does not change with kc. However, since no-investment region expands as kc increases, 
the region for the SD- or SS-horizontal system shrinks from the right.
7. Implications and Extensions 
3.7.1. As was discussed in Section 1, the original motivation of this study came from 
the comparison between Japanese systems and American systems. Typical American co-
ordination systems are characterized by the hierarchical, authoritative coordination of the 
specialized tasks, which corresponds to the hierarchical coordination system in the model. 
On the other hand, the stylized Japanese system is characterized by(i) less emphasis on 
authority and more dependence on autonomous, horizontal coordination through sharing 
of values and information, and (ii) ambiguous and fluid job separations. The N-horizontal 
system (which has the nonspecialized task structure) in the model seems closest to this 
Japanese system since (ii) results in generalist-type workers who are skilled in a wide va-
riety of jobs. Under the N-horizontal system, the top manager delegates coordination 
to subordinates who can share knowledge about various information sources since they are 
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generalists. 20Aoki (1988) asserts that the Japanese system performs better than the Amer-
ican system if the environment is "volatile." For example, Aoki explicitly characterizes the 
environment favoring the Japanese production system as lower gains from increased scale, 
short product life cycles, volatile demand shift from one variety of product to another , small 
batch sizes in production, and relatively greater need to shorten lead time from order to 
delivery. 
    The simple model presented here characterizes the environment by parameters m, h, 
kc, and kD. I call the environment more volatile the lower is h , the lower is m, and the 
higher is kD: As h is lower, the environment is more uncertain and changeable. As m is 
lower, it is less important to coordinate actions between two subordinates in each shop and 
it is more important for each shop manager to respond flexibly to the changing environment 
utilizing their on-the-spot knowledge. Scale economies are not important in such a situation . 
Finally, in the volatile environment, quick response is more important . Thus, time is more 
valuable and it is likely that the decoding cost of top kD is high . Though these parameters 
will be too simple to capture all aspects of "volatile" environments , I believe that they 
capture some elements of such environments . 
   Then the results derived from the model have some interesting implications for the 
comparison between the Japanese system and the American system. Generally speaking, 
as in Figures 9-11, the horizontal system is better than the hierarchical system for small 
m, which is consistent with the observations cited above. However, being horizontal is not 
sufficient: First, by Theorem 1(ii), if coordination across hops is very important as in an 
assembly line, we have to alter the specialized task structure under the horizontal system 
to the nonspecialized task structure, and allow workers to affect the performance in each 
shop jointly. Second, even when the nonspecialized task structure is adopted, horizontal 
systems with specialized information processing capacities are inferior to the hierarchical 
system if h is small, that is, if the environment is very changeable. We need not only the 
horizontal system but also generalists to dominate the hierarchical system in a very volatile 
environment. The horizontal system enables the firm to exploit the on-the-spot information 
available only to subordinates. Even if rn is small, however, coordination within each shop 
 20 Knowledge sharing also occurs under the SS-horizontal system about limited aspects 
of the environment. 
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is still important, if the environment is very changeable. Specialized subordinates ignore 
this fact and pursue the minimization of the direct effect too much, so that from the 
organizational point of view, the performance is far from optimal. To avoid this problem, 
generalists are needed to improve the coordination between subordinates. 
   The effect of higher decoding costs has already been discussed after Theorem 3 in the 
last section. The increase in kD expands the region that the N-horizontal system is optimal. 
3.7.2. In our model, there are two kinds of specialization; specialization in tasks and 
specialization in information processing. Though the model does not assume any externality 
between these two such as learning by doing, we showed that in volatile environments, 
nonspecialization in both information processing and tasks is necessary to dominate the 
hierarchical system. However, as Koike (1984) argues, nonspecialization n tasks is likely 
to result in nonspecialized capacities through learning by doing. In our model, this can be 
formalized by assuming that nonspecialized task structure reduces the capacity costs. The 
introduction of such an externality is clearly favorable to the N-horizontal system.21 
3.7.3. Based on several efficiency criteria, Williamson (1985) supports the authority 
relation mode in the production line with successive manufacturing stages. I do not intend 
to attack his argument since his objective is different from mine: He compares the economic 
merits of a simple hierarchy, which is the essential characteristic of the capitalist firm., with 
those of other primitive modes of ownership relations and contracting forms. The objective 
of this paper is to compare several organization structures -of the capitalist firm. Neither 
ownership nor contracting is considered. Instead, the analysis is based solely on limited 
rationality such as communication costs and limited attention. However, it seems of value 
to give some comments on his arguments. 
   Williamson's authority relation mode has properties imilar to the hierarchical coordi-
nation system: It pursues specialization of labor and adaptation to local and system shocks 
is conducted by the authority of the upper-level member. In my model, such a system 
is in fact optimal if uncertainty is relatively high (h is low) and greater need for intra-
shop coordination exists (m is high), which corresponds to greater need for local shock 
responsiveness in Williamson's words. The model shows, however, that if there exist com-
 21 I am grateful to Masahiko Aoki for this observation . 
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munication limitations, local shock responsiveness of the authority relation will be reduced 
and the advantage of the specialization of labor will become ambiguous. Then, the capital-
ist firm may adopt an organizational form different from the hierarchical system, depending 
on which of intra-shop coordination and the use of the on-the-spot information is more im-
portant. Williamson considers the situation that the value of on-the-spot information is 
relatively low. 
    Another comment on Williamson's work concerns his argument of "selective inter-
vention." Williamson himself modeled communication distortion problems in Williamson 
(1967) and concluded that the control oss by the top manager in the large organization 
limits the size of the optimal organization. Later in Williamson (1985), he criticizes this 
early work by saying that it does not permit selective intervention. He says, "Intervention 
at the top.. .always occurs selectively, which is to say only upon a showing of expected 
net gains (p.133, emphasis n the original)." My model shows, however, that the optimal 
information structure depends upon the adopted coordination system. Especially when the 
environment is changeable, the optimal capacities are either specialization or nonspecial-
ization, depending on which of the hierarchical system or the N-horizontal system is the 
best. If the on-the-spot information is initially more valuable and the top manager decides 
not to intervene in the operating decision of subordinates, it is best to accumulate nonspe-
cialized capacities in subordinates. If, however, the the intra-shop coordination becomes 
more important later, it is best for the top manager to accumulate specialized capacities 
in subordinates and to intervene. However, modifying the capacities once accumulated is 
costly, so that intervention may not be beneficial. Therefore, selective intervention may 
not be as easy as expected. 
3.7.4. The analysis was conducted under Assumption (A-2) which says that there is no 
communication between subordinates under the horizontal system. If this assumption is 
relaxed, the performance of the horizontal system will improve, so that the region where the 
hierarchical system is superior will shrink. The more important effect is that the interchange 
of information may favor the SD-horizontal system more than the N-horizontal system and 
the SS-horizontal system because the interchange of information improves the coordination 
between subordinates under the SD-horizontal system while keeping the efficient use of 
the on-the-spot information by specialization. Therefore it is expected that the region 
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where the N-horizontal system is the best may expand upward, but may shrink from the 
right. On the other hand, the marginal decoding costs of shop managers depend on the 
information processing capacities they have. For example, if K(0) is extremely high, so 
that each shop manager cannot understand a report concerning some information source, 
say X, without he knowledge capacity for X , then some degree of nonspecialization will 
be necessary. Therefore the effect of allowing horizontal communication depends on the 
balance of these two opposite ffects. If specialization in different information sources does 
not hurt the ability to communicate v ry much, the advantage ofgeneralists will be reduced. 
For example, in a "kanban" system, clearly the horizontal communication by"kanban" is 
important while job rotation among various hop floors is also common. The information 
to each shop conveyed by "kanban" is generally simple (the amount and timing of delivery 
of each type of parts produced in that shop), and so understanding the information will 
not take as much time as the center understanding and processing the information from all 
shops. Therefore in every day manufacturing and delivery, being generalists may not be 
valuable. However, if some mergent events like machine breakdown happen, nonspecialized 
workers can jointly detect the source of breakdown while coordinating their actions. Hence 
generalists are of value in this respect. 
    Another argument supporting the N-horizontal system is the number of communication 
channels needed. For example, when there are four subordinates, each subordinate needs to 
exchange and process information from the other three subordinates. Thus, the horizontal 
system will need twelve information channels, while the hierarchical system will need only 
four channels." Therefore sometimes the implicit understanding of other subordinates by 
nonspecialized and homogeneous capacities may be better than the horizontal system with 
explicit communication a d may characterize some aspects of Japanese firms. 
3.7.5. One might ask why top herself does not use her time to collect information 
concerning the state variables in order to utilize the on-the-spot information or to reduce 
the decoding cost. Although I have not been explicit, I assume in the model that top has 
to attend to some variables concerning strategic decisions while subordinates are collecting 
 22 In the "kanban" system
, by virtue of the tree structure of the automobile production 
line (each shop supplying its parts to only one subsequent shop), it will need six channels 
when there are four shops. 
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and processing information concerning X and Y. Allocating her scarce time to information 
sources relevant to operating decisions such as X and Y is assumed to be prohibitively 
costly because it reduces the quality of strategic decisions drastically, so by ignoring this 
possibility, I compared two coordination systems based on the performance of operating 
decisions. If information activities relevant to strategic decisions are introduced into the 
model, there may be the possibility that top allocates some time to the information sources 
concerning operating decisions, at the cost of lower quality in strategic decisions. 
3.7.6.. In the model introduced, the source of the cost of the hierarchical system is 
that top has limited attention and- that spending more time reading reports creates more 
costs of delay in her decision making. In the model presented, each subordinate sends 
what he observes. However, he may require to write some summary reports for the top 
manager. This idea can be formalized by assuming that communication channels have 
limited dimensionality; each communication channel can send only a one-dimensional value 
of variables. Under this assumption, each subordinate i is assumed to send a convex 
combination fhis information dZXi + (1 - di)YE to either top or the other subordinate, 
where d2 E [0, 1] is the choice variable of subordinate i. 
    Introducing this dimension restriction assumption into the model analyzed does not 
alter our analysis at all because specialization is optimal under the hierarchical system. 
When subordinates are specialized, limited dimensionality restricts nothing because both 
X and Y are one-dimensional. Therefore, under limited dimensionality, the specialization 
in different information sources is still optimal under the hierarchical system. 
    This limited dimensionality plays an important role if the information sources X and 
Y are multidimensional. Suppose that the top manager has unlimited attention (KD = 0), 
and that each multidimensional information source is inseparable in the sense that each 
element of the multidimensional random variable cannot be observed separately: By spend-
ing time t= on X = (X',..., X91), subordinate i isassumed to observe X2 = (XZ ,... , X= ) 
where Xz = X i + Ei with di Normally and independently distributed with mean zero and 
precision pzt=. However, each subordinate can send only a one-dimensional signal through 
a communication channel. Then, without decoding costs, this creates a cost in the hier-
archical system, and the on-the-spot information is of value as in the model presented in 
Section 2. This model with multidimensional information sources and limited dimension-
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ality is much more complicated, so that the analysis is not easy. However, I conjecture 
that qualitative results will be the same. In addition, we can predict that when the di-
mension of the information sources increases, the region where the hierarchical system is 
optimal will shrink. This higher dimension can be interpreted as another measure of volatile 
environments. 
3.7.7. The analysis in this paper was based on team theory and we completely ignored 
incentive problems. One might assert that since incentive aspects are ignored, the analysis 
would have given too much advantage on the horizontal system over the hierarchical system. 
However, the nonspecialization in information sources under the horizontal system can re-
duce some cost due to incentive problems. If the contribution of each subordinate is public 
information, nonspecialization will make the contribution of one subordinate more corre-
lated with that of another, so that relative performance evaluation may reduce costs due 
to incentive problems. (See Holmstrom (1982) for detailed arguments.) The nonspecialized 
capacities under the horizontal system may work as a device for reducing opportunistic 
behavior by subordinates. 
   More importantly, the hierarchical system itself may create some additional costs under 
incentive-based models. When the hierarchical system is adopted, subordinates may distort 
their information i their favor as analyzed in Tirole (1986), or subordinates may spend too 
much time attempting to influence top's decisions to their advantage and attend to their 
local management less intensively than optimal from top's point of view, as is discussed 
in Milgrom (1988) and Milgrom and Roberts (1987). These authors conclude from those 
sources of the costs of the hierarchical system, that some degree of decentralization is 
desirable.
8. Concluding Remarks 
This paper analyzed the hierarchical coordination system and the horizontal coordination 
system by a simple model based on limited rationality. We derived the optimal information 
structure and the task structure under each coordination system and the optimal orga-
nization structure of the firm by comparing them. The firm accumulates different kinds 
of information processing capacities under different coordination systems, depending on 
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characteristics of the outside environment such as the prior precision of the environmental 
variable and the importance of two kinds of coordination effects. The main results are 
summarized as follows: 
 1._ When coordination across hops (or industries into which the firm diversifies) is unnec-
   essary, the optimal organization structure is the horizontal coordination system with 
   the specialized task structure and the information structure such that subordinates 
   specialize in different information sources. This corresponds to the M-form organiza-
   tion. 
 2. However, when inter-shop coordination is extremely important (or the firm operates 
   in two very related industries), this M-form structure is never optimal. Intervention 
   by the upper-level manager is better in information utilization and coordination. To 
   utilize on-the-spot information, we require the nonspecialized task structure to make 
   subordinates work jointly in each shop. 
 3. When the environment is volatile (so that the prior variance ishigh, on-the-spot infor-
   mation is valuable, and the communication is costly), the optimal organization struc-
   ture requires the horizontal coordination system with nonspecialization in information 
    sources as well as the nonspecialized task structure. 
   One drawback of the model is that it is so abstract and stylized that the interpretation 
of the model (for example, the payoff unction of the firm) is not clear. The next step 
would be to apply the approach developed in this paper to more specific situations such 
as coordination problems in assembly lines or relationship between organization structures 
and diversification strategies of the firm. 
   Finally, I mention some related existing literature analyzing the information structure 
of the organization. There is no literature analyzing information processing capacities di-
rectly. However, some literature provides models of the organization where capacities of 
lower-level members are indirectly determined by the higher-level managers' decisions con-
cerning organization. Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1985) formalize a model of hierarchies 
with multiple managers. Their general model is similar to mine in that, since attention 
is a divisible scarce resource and there are several information sources to be attended to, 
each member in the organization decides how to allocate his or her attention to various 
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information sources. The top manager can control members' allocation decision by speci-
fying decision times. However, members' information processing capacities are not under 
the top's control. Also their concern is in analyzing hierarchy; they do not provide any 
alternative organizational structure. 
   Aoki (1986) analyzes two kinds of information structure, called the vertical and the 
horizontal structure. His model is more dynamic. The cost of the vertical structure (which 
is similar to the hierarchical system in my model) comes from both top manager's imperfect 
observation of emerging events and time delay in implementing actions. On the other hand, 
when the horizontal structure is chosen, shop managers respond to local shocks repeatedly, 
which encourages them to improve their information processing capacities by learning by 
doing. Then they implement actions without delay, but imperfectly in terms of horizontal 
coordination. My model is static, but emphasizes the relation between the coordination 
system and the optimal information processing capacities such as specialists vs. generalists, 
which is not analyzed in his model. 
   Green and Laffont (1986) is similar in spirit to our model. They compare two commu-
nication systems, centralization and interchange of information, both of which install two 
communication channels. There are two agents who attend to two information sources to 
obtain some noisy signals, and each of which chooses action ai and bi to aim at minimizing 
a loss function similar to ours. There are several differences between their model and mine. 
First, they do not consider the choice of information processing capacities. The precisions of 
noise terms are exogenously given. Second, they focus purely on alternative communication 
systems: There are only two agents, and even under centralization, each agent chooses its 
actions, different from the hierarchical system in my model, where the third agent, called 
top, chooses all the actions. The centralization in their model means that all information 
is centralized in one agent. Third, communication is limited not because receivers have 
limited attention, but because channels have limited dimensionality as discussed in the 
last section. Each agent sends a convex combination of his signals. However, they only 
consider the case that the prior variances of the state variables are infinite, so that if ever 
communication occurs, mixed signals are not used. This simplifies their analysis greatly, 
though they cannot examine the effect of the prior variances on the optimal structure, 
which is the main concern in this paper. Their concern is in the effect of the exogenously 
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given precisions of the noise terms on the optimal structure. For example, in the limiting 
case that µ -} oo in the loss function, they show that the most accurate observer of each 
state variable should transmit his observation to the other agent. Their analysis seems to 
be relevant to an investigation of the conditions under which hierarchical relations in the 
sense of.information concentration appear as an optimal structure. The analysis in this 
paper concerns the optimal organization structure of the already hierarchical firm.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. 
   We first prove this lemma under the assumption that decoding costs are zero. Suppose 
that subordinate 1 specializes in X and subordinate 2 in Y. Communication is of no value 
since the information subordinate 2 has does not improve the decision making by subordi-
nate 1 (in shop A) at all, and vice versa. Thus, given such an informational structure, the 
expected gross loss is of the form 
        L(I) = Var(X IX1) + Var(Y IY2) = (hx + p1)-1 + (hy + q2)-'-
Top chooses p1and q2 to minimize L(I) + Kcp1 + Kcq2. The optimal solution is given by 
p1 = max[(Kc)-1/2 - hx,0] and q2 = max[(Kc)-1/2 - hy,0] and the optimal value of 
the expected gross loss is 
                L = min [ Kc, hX1 ] + min [ K c, hy1] . 
Let C be the optimal value of the expected net loss (the sum of L and the information 
costs). Then 
      ,C = min [ Kc (2 - Kchx), hX1 ] + min [ Kc (2 - Kchy), hY1] . (Al) 
   Next consider the specialization in the same information source. Suppose, without 
loss of generality, that both managers attend to X. Clearly, communication is of no value. 
Then 
         L(Z) = Var(X IX1) X2) + Var(Y) = (hx + p1 + p2)-1 + hy1 
Top chooses p1and p2 to minimize L(I) + Kcp1 + Kcp2. The optimal solution satisfies 
P1 + P2 = max [(Kc)-1/2 - hx] and 
               L= min [N/A c, hX1] + hy1 
(A2) 
               L=min[ VIKc(2- Kchx),hX1] +hY1. 
It is clear by comparing (Al) and (A2) that he former isbetter. 
   Finally consider the case that both managers are generalists, that is, pi > 0, qt > 0, 
and t= E (0, 1). Then since decoding costs are zero, the expected gross loss is of the form 
        L(I) = Var(X ~ X1, X2) + Var(Y Y1,Y2) 
              (hx+plt1 +p2t2)-1 +(hy+q1(1-t1)+q2(1-t2))-1. 
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Top tries to find p1, P21 q1 , q2 , t1, and t2 that minimize L(1) +                                       E z_ I Ii c (pi + q2) •
first-order conditions are 
                             (hx +pit, + p2t2)-2t2 = Kc 
               (hy + q1(1 - t1) + q2(1 - t2))-2(1 - t2) = Kc 
for i = 1, 2. Hence t1 = t2 = t. Given t E (0, 1) as a parameter, we obtain from (A3), 
               p1 + P2 = max [(tKc)-1/2 - hx /t, 0] 




 L = min [\/k c ,hx1 +min [\/Tkc , hyl 
                t 1-t 
                                              (A4)
     I VKe Ii e 1  IV Ii e Kc _ 1    C =min t 2 - t hx , hX + min 1 - t 2 1 _ t by , by 
To compare (A4) with. (Al), we show that for all t E (0, 1), the first term in L in (A4) is 
at least as large as the first term in (Al), which is sufficient. First note that (Iic/t)-1/2 < 
Kc1 /2 for t E (0,1). Thus if h > Kc1 /2, both are equal to h-1. If (K /t)-1 /2 < h < 
Iic1/2, clearly the first term in (Al) is smaller. Finally, for h < (Kc/t)-1/2, 
        a Ii e Iic Iic d 1 
        at t 2 t hx = 2 he 1 - t hx dt < 0. 
Thus, the first term in (Al) is smaller. Therefore, for all t E (0, 1), specialization in different 
information sources are better. 
   Now suppose that decoding costs are positive. Since we have shown that the optimal 
information structure under the assumption of zero decoding costs has no communication, 
the result does not change: specialization in different information sources is optimal . 
Proof of Lemma 4. 
   The first-order necessary conditions for p2 > 0, q2 > 0, ri > 0, si > 0, and ti E (0,1) 
are given as follows: 
                            tZ t A-2
= 2Kc; (A5p)                       (
p2t2 + r2)2 
               B-2 (1_ ti)s? = 2KC; (A5q) 
                (q2(1 ti) + S,)2 
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                      A-2 Piti 2 = 2KD;                 (pi t+rz 
                B-2 qi(1 - ti) 2 = 2K                                      D;               (qi(I-ti)+si 
                                   2 2 
                           A-2 pi r2 = B-2 gisi 
                      (piti+ri)2 (qi(1 - ti) + si)2 
where 
                   A = h + pltl r1 + P2 t2 r2 
                          p1t1 + r1 p2t2 + r2 
                 B=h+ q1(l-t1)sl + g2(1-t2)s2 
                       ql(1 -t1)+st q2(l -t2)+s2 
From (A5p), (A5q), and (A5t), we obtain 
                                ti - pi 
                              pi +qi 
From (A5r) and (A5s), 
                           A-1 = /kD 1 + ri 
                                        Piti 
                         B-1 = V2-kD 1 + 
                                      qi(1 si -ti) 
Since ti minimizes A-1 + B-1, the first-order necessary condition is 
                              piri 
2 + qisi 2 - 0.                      (pit,) (qi(1 - t,)) 
Substituting (A6) into (A8) yields 
                                      ri Si 
                      pi qi 
Also substituting (A6) and (A7) into (A5t) yields 
                                          r? -S?                                                                                            _Z 2 
                    pi qi . 
From (A9) and (AlO), we obtain ri = si, so that pi = qj and ti = 1/2. 
The Derivation of N(.) and H(.) 
   The derivation is straightforward. Fi stconsider NSD(.). Since 
                   (2/ kc) -1 < ( 2mkc) -1, 
by solving SN = SSD for h < (2/kc) -1, we obtain 
                      NSD(912, kc) _ - 1 
                                 2m (-\/-2m - 1) kc 















Since NSD < (2 / kc)-1 by (All), this is well defined. Similarly, Solving SN = Sss for 
h < (2/kc) -1 yields 
                     Nss(m, kc) (A13) 
                                   2mkc 
Again, since NSS < (2/kc) -1 by (All), this is well defined. 
   Next, consider HSD(.). First note that 
          (~k) -1 < ( 2mkc) -1 if and only if m < k2/kc. (A14) 
Suppose h is smaller than both critical levels in (A14). Then by solving SH = SSD, we 
obtain 
                      HSD(m, kc, kD) = V - 1. (A15) 
                                     2mkD 
However, we can show 
             HSD < (/k) -1 if and only if m < k2 /kC. (A16) 
Therefore form < k2 /kC, (A15) is valid. For m > k2 /kc, we have 
                        HsD(m, kc, kD) = 1 . (A17)                                                    ,\,F2k 
The similar procedure yi lds 
                     Hss(m, kc, kD) = - 1 (A18) 
                                      2k - 2mkc 
form < k2/kC. When m > k2/kc, Hss(.) is equal to HsD(.) in (A17). The functions 
N(-) and H(-) are derived from these directly. 
   The proof of Lemma 5 follows from N(.) and H(.) derived above. Concerning (i) and 
(ii), note that 
             NSD(2, kc) = Nss(2, kc) = (n - 1) /(2kc), 
            HSD(2, kc, kD) = Hss(2, kc, kD) = (v - 1)/(2kD), 
and 
    N(m, kc) = H(m, kc, kD) = (k - /kc) /(\kkD) for m = k2/(2kc). 
Assertions (iii) and (iv) can be obtained bydifferentiating hem. Finally, (v) holds because 
of Proposition 1 (i). 
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FIGURE 2a. The horizontal coor dination system with nonspeciali zed task structure.
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FIGURE 2b. The horizontal coor dination system with specialized task structure.
Z = X1+el l 
    Yl+Vl

















Z = X2+e2 
 2 Y
2+V2
      X-










       ~1(X2,Y2,Z 
Shop B 






























                         ,/2 





















The optimal cost saving
     1 1 
     V-2 
































    N(m=4)fN(m=2) 
         N(m=1.5) 



















The optimal coordination system. (The case k2/(2kc) < 1.)
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